Is inflation all due to money? by Albert E. Burger
II
I.NFLATION is an all-pervasive problem which af-
fects everyone’s decisions. Individuals must consider
the outlook for prices when planning budgets or wage
demands, when deciding whether to buy a house or
in what form to hold savings, as well as a multitude
of other economic decisions. Also, business is increas-
ingly concerned about the outlook for inflation, espe-
cially as it relates to planning and capital investment.1
It is not surprising, therefore, that persistent inflation
has led to increased public demands that something
be done to correct the problem.
The current Administration has responded to these
demands by announcing an anti-inflation program
which includes, among other aspects, a promise to
intervene in individual price and wage decisions in
an attempt to reduce inflationary pressures. But such
an approach, at best, has only a very limited chance
for success because it fails to distinguish between two
key characteristics of the inflation process. First, there
are increases (or decreases) in prices which result from
nonmonetary factors that cover a gamut of influences
such as the effects of weather on agriculture and
actions of foreign oil producers. The basic character-
istic of all these nonmonetary factors is that they
have a transitory influence on inflation. They have
their impact on the level of pricesin selected periods,
but their influence is either reversed in following
periods or ceases to be a cause of period-after-period
changes in prices in the same direction. It is the sec-
ond aspect of inflation, the trend or persistent year-
after-year increase of prices, that is really “public
enemy number one.” This is the aspect of inflation
to which corrective economic policy must be directed.
Otherwise, all other economic programs to stop infla-
tion will end in frustration.
Ianaa a íaflar a~a
The rate of change of prices can show considerable
short-term fluctuation. For example, the implicit price
deflator for gross national product rose at a 5 percent
1John A. Tatom and James E. Turley, “Inflation and Taxes:
Disincentives for Capital Formation,” this Review (January
1978), pp. 2-8.
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rate in the third and fourth quarters of 1977, accele-
rated to about a 7 percent rate in the first quarter of
1978, rose further to an 11 percent rate in the second
quarter, only to recede back to a7percent rate in the
third quarter of 1978.
In addition to this variation in the general price
index, there are also frequent fluctuations in the prices
of individual items included in the general price in-
dexes. Since pronounced swings in the prices of spe-
cific goods or services sometimes coincide with fluc-
tuations in the general index of prices, specific items
are frequently cited as the cause of the current infla-
tion. Also, because the magnitude and timing of price
changes vary from item to item, the blame for in-
flation is often transferred, from period-to-period,
from one item to another. Consequently, a number
of explanations of the inflation process have been
offered, involving at various times the behavior of
such diverse items as steel prices, exchange rate move-
ments, union wage demands, agricultural conditions,
changes in minimum wages and eventhe behavior of
the periodically elusive anchovy. Such an analysis
provides an ever-changing array of inflation villains.
The blame for inflation is shifted from Arabs to coffee
producers to beef producers to steel producers to
specific union leaders to large banks and so on.
Concentration on such short-term oscillations in the
various elements of price indexes clouds the issue of
the fundamental force behind the persistent increase
in the general level of prices. The problem of inflation
is much more than an unfortunate sequence of in-
creases in the prices of particular items. Focusing
attention on movements in the price of particular items
or each wiggle in the general price indexes gives only
a description of where and when the general infla-
tionary pressures fall in the economy. The important
issue is why prices, on average, continue to rise over
an extended period of time.
An explanation of the fundamental source of a con-
tinued pressure on prices requires a broader, longer-
run perspective that incorporates monetary develop-
inents. When the money stock grows too rapidly
relative to the rate of increase of goods and services,
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individuals find themselves holding more money than
they demand, given existing income, prices, and yields
(including interest rates) on other assets. In the proc-
ess by which they attempt to pull their holdings of
money in line with the quantity demanded, inflation
results. To put the matter more simply, when “too
much money is chasing too few goods” there will be
persistent increases in prices. Consequently, analysis
of persistent increases in the general level of prices
requires consideration of the growth of the money
stock. Such a monetary view contends that although
prices can periodically rise or fall sharply due to
nonmonetary factors, inflation continues only if these
nonmonetary factors recur in succeeding periods, or
if there is a continued excessive expansion of money.
The emphasis which is placed on the role of mone-
tary actions in the fight against inflation depends very
much on which of these two aspects of price changes
is the center of attention. Concentration on movements
in individual prices or short-term movements in the
general price indexes typically leads to assignment
of a limited role to monetary actions, a focus of at-
tention on nonmonetary factors, and the recommen-
dation of some form of direct controls on the prices
of specific items. In contrast, consideration of why
prices continue to increase period after period, pin-
points the rate of monetary expansion as the prime
factor in the fight against inflation.
To illustrate the difference between inflation caused
by monetary factors and short-term movements in
price indexes caused by nonmonetary factors, consider
the following simple monetary guide to inflation:2
The rate of change of prices over the next year is
equal to the average rate of growth of the money
stock over the previous five years.
The results of using this shorthand representation
of the driving force behind the inflation process and
its long-run character are presented in Table J~3The
information in this table shows that, over the period
1953-71, past or trend growth rates of money were
a reasonably good guide to the year-to-year behavior
of prices. During this nineteen-year period, the
2
For other examples of the use of monetary guides to inflation,
see Richard T. Selden, “Inflation: Are We Winning the
Fighil,” Morgan Guaranty Survey (October 1977), pp. 7-13,
and Allan Meltzer, “It Takes Long-Range Planning to Lick
Inflation,” Fortune (December 1977), pp. 96-106.
3
Annual data are calculated as to the average of the four
quarters of data in a given year. For example, the growth
rate of prices from 1976 to 1977 on an annual basis is com-
puted by comparing the average of the four quarters in 1977
to the average of the four quarters in 1976.
Table I
Monetary Growth as an Indicator of Inflation
(1) (2)
Growth Rot’, Growth Rate
P,,riod of Moray Period o’ P,cas 11)-I 29
1947 52 2.3% 1953 1.5% 0.8
1948-53 2.7 1954 1.4 1.3
1949-54 3.2 1955 2.2 1.0
1950-55 3.3 1956 3.1 0.2
1951.56 2.7 1957 34 0.7
1952-57 1.8 1958 1 6 0.2
1953-58 1.5 1959 2.2 0.7
1954-59 2.0 1960 1.7 0.3
1953-60 1 3 1961 0.9 0.4
195661 1.5 1962 1 8 -0.3
1957-62 1.8 1963 1.5 0.3
1958-63 2.2 1964 16 06
1959-64 2.2 1965 2.2 0.0
1960-65 3.1 1966 3.3 0.2
1961-66 36 1967 2.9 0.7
1962-67 4.0 1968 4.5 -0.5
1963-68 4.8 1969 5.0 0.2
1964-69 52 1970 5.4 —0.2
1965-70 5.1 1971 5.1 0.0
1966 71 5.5 1972 4.1 1.4
1967-72 6.1 19/3 5.8 0.3
1968-73 6.2 1974 9.7 -3.5
1969-74 6.1 1975 9.6 3.5
1970-75 6.2 1976 5.2 1.0
1971 -76 6.0 1977 5.9 0.1
average dillerence betueen aclual yearly inflation
and thst indicated by the past rate of monetary ex-
pansion was only 0,2 percentage point, and in two-
thirds of the years the error was 0.5 percentage point
or less. On a quarter-to-quarter basis, the rate of
change of prices oscillated around the trend rate of
inflation. However, the rate of change of prices re-
turned consistently to that dictated by the rate of
monetary expansion.
Also during this period, changes in the five-year
trend growth of money accurately indicated changes
in the year-to-year rate of inflation. As the trend
growth of money slowed in the period 1958-63, in-
flation was reduced. Over the next eight years, the
trend growth of money accelerated steadily from
less than a2percent rate to a5percent rate, and
inflation rose from less than 2 percent to 5 percent
per year.
in contrast to the 1953-71 period, the last six years
present some examples of abnormally large differences
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between changes in the price index and the inflation
indicated by past growth rates of money. in particu-
lar, 1972 and 1974-75 stand out as glaring exceptions
to the previous performance of the monetary guide
to inflation. To understand the behavior of inflation
since 1971, and how this experience fits into the
general monetary explanation of inflation, it is crucial
that one clearly understand the effect of nonmonetary
factors on the behavior of prices. Specifically, it is
very important to realize that, although the level of
prices can change, sometimes even for a prolonged
period, the rate of change of prices cannot continue
to substantially deviate from the rate of monetary
expansion.4
What special nonmonetary factors in 1972 and
1974-75 operated to cause such large deviations of
actual changes in prices from those indicated by
past growth rates of money?5 First, 1972 was a year
of price controls. By law, reported prices were not
allowed to fully reflect market pressures, especially
those pushing prices upward. Under such circum-
stances, the reported change in prices would be
expected to be considerably less than inflation in-
dicated by a monetary guide. From the perspective
of a monetary interpretation of inflation, the gap in
1972 between price changes consistent with past
money growth (about 5.5 percent) and those re-
ported during wage and price controls (about 4
percent) indicates (1) an upsurge of prices when
price controls were removed, and (2) an incentive
for transactions to take place at prices above posted
prices.
Other major differences between reported changes
in prices and those indicated by past monetary expan-
sion occur in the more recent period of 1974-75. Over
this period, the level of prices was sharply and un-
expectedly raised by the now well-known pricing
actions of the major oil-producing nations and the
nonmonetary effects of weather on agriculture. The
actions of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) resulted in a substantial, unex-
pected rise in the price of energy. Since energy is a
basic input into most production processes, these
Table II
Growth Rates of Selected
Components of Consumer Prices
Alt Items Monetary
Food Energy los Food Rote of
Period Pr’ce Prices and Energy Intlot on
11/71 — IV/72 39% 37% 3.1% 6M%
tV/72 1/74 196 223 4.4 6-0
1/74 111/75 aa 139 97 60
111/75—11/78 62 69 66 60
OPEC actions had a widespread, and unexpected up-
ward effect on costs of production. There was a de-
crease in the effective productive capacity of the
economy. With aggregate demand affected to only a
minor extent and real output reduced, the level of
prices rose sharply.6 Consequently, the rate of change
of prices, computed over the period when these sharp
upward adjustments in the level of prices took place,
would be expected to be substantially, but tempo-
rarily, higher than that indicated by past monetary
expansion. As their effect was absorbed in the econ-
orny, however, the rate of change of prices fell back
to that dictated by the trend rate of money growth.
Although in 1976-77 inflation returned to the rate
dictated by monetary expansion, the level of prices
remained about 4 percent higher, reflecting the effect
of the OPEC actions.
Table II shows the movement of prices of selected
groups of items during the period from mid-1971 to
mid-1978. As shown in the table, price increases of
all items other than food and energy were held to
about a 3-4 percent rate while general price controls
were in effect (August 1971 through April 1974).
After controls were removed from most items, prices
accelerated to about a 10 percent rate, as shown in
the period 1/74 — 111/75. Table II also clearly shows
that the sharp surge in prices from late 1973 into
late 1975 was initially led by the sharp rise in agri-
cultural and energy prices7 and then was reinforced
by the adjustment of prices of all other items re-
sulting from the removal of price controls in early
1974. None of these components of consumer prices
6
For a technical discussion of the effect of the rise in energy
prices, see Kamosky, “The Link Between Money and Prices
— 1971-76,” pp. 17-23; Robert H. Rasche and John A. Tatom,
“The Effects of the New Energy Regime and Economic Ca-
pacity, Production, and Prices,” this Review (May 1977), pp.
2-12; and “Energy Resources and Potential CNP,” this Re-
view (June 1977), pp. 10-24.
T
Price controls on agricultural products were removed in Sep-
tember 1973. The initial OPEC rise in oil prices came in late
1973.
4
Even here, however, monetary factors still play a role, although
indirectly. Autonomous events can have an effect on the de-
mand for money, which, if not matched by a one-time change
in the money supply, result in a one-time increase in the
level of prices. In such instances, prices rise not because of an
excessive increase in the money supply but because of exces-
sive money balances created by a decrease in money demand.
5
For a more complete technical discussion of the effects of
special developments in 1972-74, see Denis S. Kamosky, “The
Link Between Money and Prices —1971-76,” this Review
(June 1976), pp. 17-23.
Page 10FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF St. LOUIS
(food, energy, all other) continued the sustained
double digit rate of increase. Since 1975 the average
rate of increase of all these prices has fallen back into
line with the sustainable rate indicated by the past
i-ates of monetary expansion.
The above discussion has important implications
for assessing the effects of past, current, and pros-
pective monetary actions in the battle against in-
flation. The experience of the last six years makes
it clear that it can be just as misleading to ascribe
each and every reported increase in prices entirely
to monetary factors as it is to ignore the effect of
money on inflation. Consequently, failure to separate
the monetary (trend) and nonmonetary (transitory)
aspects of inflation can lead to confused demands on
policymakers.
To illustrate the importance of this distinction,
consider economic developments over the last six
years. During the three-year period ended in the
second quarter of 1971, the persistent rate of infla-
tion was very much in line with the rate indicated
by a monetary guide to inflation. Over the next six
quarters, however, prices rose at about a4per-
cent rate. Could this fall in inflation be attributed
to monetary actions? The answer is no, the fall in
reported inflation was strictly due to nonmonetary
factors, that is, price controls that went into effect
in August 1971.
From early 1973 through early 1975 prices rose
very rapidly. From a 4 percent rate, inflation ac-
celerated to about an 8 percent rate in the year
ended first quarter 1974. Then, over the next four
quarters inflation took another sharp leap upward,
averaging 11.6 percent. If one attributes all of these
increases in prices during this period to the cumu-
lative effect of past monetary actions, then it appears
that the Federal Reserve had let things get seriously
out of hand. On the other hand, if the short-run in-
fluences of nonmonetary developments on prices are
taken into consideration, quite a different conclusion
emerges. Careful analysis of the effects on prices of
weather, OPEC actions, and the removal of price
controls would indicate a sharp rise in the level of
prices beginning in late 1973 that was not the result
of past monetary actions. The basic rate of inflation,
the one determined by the cumulative effect of
past monetary actions, remained at about 6 percent.
Early in 1975, inflation dropped sharply, and aver-
aged 6.5 percent over the remainder of the year.
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Then inflation eased further to a 4.4 percent rate
over the first three quarters of 1976. Was this sub-
stantial slowing in inflation the result of monetary
policy actions? Again the answer is no. The slowing
in the rate of change of prices from the double-digit
pace of 1974 reflected only that the OPEC actions
of late 1973 were not repeated in the following years,
the general adjustment of other prices to the removal
of price controls had been completed, and favorable
agricultural conditions resulted in a sharp drop in the
rate of increase of food prices. Did the basic infla-
tion slowto a sustained 4.5 percent rate by late 1976?
.kgain the answer is no. From late 1976 to the end
of 1977 inflation returned to a 6 percent rate, the
same as that indicated by the trend growth of money.
What was the effect of monetary actions, as mea-
sured by the growth of the money stock, on inflation
over the six-year period 1972-77? In particular, what
was the effect of allowing Ml to grow at about an 8
percent rate from late 1971 to early 1973, then cut-
ting Ml growth to 6 percent for a year, further
slashing it to 4 percent for a year, and then progres-
sively reaccelerating Ml growth, first to 5 percent
for six quarters, and then to almost 8 percent over
the two-year period ended in the third quarter of
1978? Did these gyrations in money growth substan-
tially change the basic rate of inflation? Using the
past growth pattern of Ml as a guide to inflation,
then again the answer is no. Money had grown at a
6 percent rate over the five years (20 quarters)
ended in the fourth quarter of 1971, remained at 6
percent in the 20 quarters ended in early 1975 and
by the end of the fourth quarter of 1977 the twenty-
quarter growth rate of Ml was still essentially 6
percent.
In analyzing the inflationary process, one must be
careful to avoid shortsightedness. In particular, short-
run gyrations in prices must be distinguished from
persistent changes in prices. Monetary policy cannot
prevent the quarter-to-quarter fluctuations in the price
level that naturally result from the dynamics of eco-
nomic activity. However, concentrating on only these
short-run fluctuations in the level of prices can result
in falsely blaming nonmonetary factors for a persistent
rise in prices. The analysis of inflation then tends to
bounce, month-to-month, quarter-to-quarter from one
item or sector of the economy to another. Such an
approach diverts attention from the role of monetary
actions, results in failure to permanently reduce in-
flation and ultimately means that inflation will return
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to plague the economy. The monetary actions of the
government must be given a key position in any
program to permanently reduce persistent inflation.
Over the first half of 1978, prices rose at about a 9
percent rate. Should inflation be expected to continue
at this rate? The monetary guide presented in this
paper, indicates a persistent inflation of about 6.2
percent for the period 111/78 — 111/79. Some econo-
mists would contend that individuals now adapt their
expectations of inflation more rapidly than previously,
hence, a five-year trend rate of growth for Ml is too
long. If the period for calculating the trend rate of
money is shortened to four years, the inflation indi-
cated for 111/78 — 111/79 rises to 6.4 percent. Short-
ening the period further to three years, raises the
basic inflation rate to 6.8 percent for the next year.
Consequently, the lasting rate of inflation indicated
by past monetary developments falls in a fairly nar-
row range of 6.2-7 percent, nowhere near a 9 per-
cent rate.
However, just because a rough monetary guide to
inflation, such as the one presented in this article,
does not indicate that past monetary actions have
yet cumulated into a 9 percent persistent inflation
should not be taken as a cause for rejoicing. A per-
sistent inflation of 6.5-7 percent is still at least three
times as fast as any lasting inflation the U.S. economy
experienced from the end of World War II through
1965. Furthermore, historical evidence indicates that
the development of such a persistent inflation is a
rather sluggish process that does not adjust immedi-
ately to accelerations or decelerations of the growth
of money.8
Currently, the trend rate of money growth is being
held down by the 5 percent growth rate that pre-
vailed from the third quarter of 1973 to the third
quarter of 1976. In sharp contrast, over the last two
years (111/76 — 111/78), the average rate of monetary
expansion accelerated to 8 percent. As the effect of
the 5 percent growth wears off, if money continues
to grow at an 8 percent or faster rate, inflation will
rise sharply to a persistent, year-after-year, 8-9 percent
rate.
t
For example, growth of money (Ml) accelerated to about a
7 percent annual rate in 1968, after rising at an ayerage rate
of about
4
percent over the previous five years. Inflation did
not rise to 7 percent in 1968, instead it was 4.5 percent, about
in line with the 4 percent average growth of Ml over the
previous five years. However, as the money stock continued
to grow rapidly by past standards — at a 6 percent rate in
1969—the five year average growth of Ml rose to 5.2 per-
cent by the end of 1969 and the rate of inflation moved up to
5.4 percent in 1970. This increase in inflation took place even
though the growth of Ml subsequently decreased to about a
4 percent rate in 1970.
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